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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CORPORATE
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Samuel R. Miller*
Lawrence C. Levine"
This century has witnessed a sweeping expansion of the doc-
trine of corporate criminal liability. From a time when corporations
were deemed immune from criminal liability,1 the law has
progressed to a point where a corporation is liable for specific intent
crimes committed by a low-level employee acting contrary to express
corporate instruction as long as the employee is acting within the
scope of employment and for the purpose of benefitting the corpora-
tion.' Through the adoption and expansion of the tort doctrine of
respondeat superior, the criminal intent of the corporate employee or
agent is imputed to the corporation itself.'
Much has been written about the imposition of corporate crimi-
nal liability.4 This article elucidates some of the areas of recent de-
bate and highlights recent cases. In particular, the article considers
the effect of corporate compliance programs, the criminal liability of
dissolved and successor corporations, and recent concepts in the sen-
tencing of corporations. The article also examines current decisions
concerning the doctrine of intracorporate conspiracy, specifically
looking at RICO prosecutions.
o 1984 by Samuel R. Miller and Lawrence C. Levine.
Mr. Miller is a partner in the San Francisco office of Morrison & Foerster.
* Mr. Levine is an associate in the San Francisco office of Morrison & Foerster.
1. See, e.g., State v. Great Works Milling & Mfg. Co., 20 Me. 41 (1841).
2. See generally'Miller, Corporate Criminal Liability: A Principle Extended to Its Lim-
its, 38 FED. B.J. 49 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Miller]. (The article examines the circum-
stances in which acts and intent of lower-level employees may be imputed to the corporation).
3. See id. at 49 n.3. See also Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation, 19 U. Ps-r. L.
REV. 21 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Mueller]. (The article examines the view of the Model
Penal Code on corporate criminal liability).
4. See Miller, supra note 2; Elkins, Corporations and the Criminal Law: An Uneasy
Alliance, 65 Ky. L.J. 73 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Elkins]; Developments in the
Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Santions, 92
HARV L. REV. 1227 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
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I. RECENT CASES AND THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Recent cases. adhere to the broad rule that a corporation is lia-
ble for the criminal acts of its officers, agents and employees commit-
ted within the scope of their employment and for the benefit of the
corporation.5 In United States v. Cincotta,' the court presented a
clear statement of the current law in reaching its conclusion that the
corporate defendant could be held responsible for its employees' acts
of filing false claims for payment within the United States. The
court explained that a corporation may be convicted of the criminal
acts of its agent acting within the scope of employment. Under the
theory of respondeat superior, the court added that for the purpose
of imposing corporate criminal liability, an employee, to be acting
within the scope of his employment, must be "motivated-at least in
part-by an intent to benefit the corporation." '7 Thus, when intent is
an element of the crime, intent of the employee is imputable to the
corporation only when an intent to benefit the corporation exists.8
In Cincotta the employees whose intent was imputed to the cor-
poration were highly involved in the corporation-one being an of-
ficer and major shareholder and the other being a major shareholder
and employee. Although the source of significant debate,' the general
rule does not distinguish between officers, management and lower-
level employees for the purpose of imputing criminal intent to the
corporation. 0 The corporation "may be bound by the acts of
5. United States v. Richmond, 700 F.2d 1183, 1195 n.7 (8th Cir. 1983); United States
v. Ingredient Technology Corp., 698 F.2d 88, 99 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Cincotta,
689 F.2d 238, 241-42 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 347 (1982); United States v.
Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 1979).
6. 689 F.2d 238 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 991 (1982).
7. 689 F.2d at 242. Intent to benefit the corporation is all that is generally required;
actual benefit is irrelevant. United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 1979). In
Cincotta the court found that the intent to benefit the corporation was shown by the proof of
actual benefit to the corporation through a scheme to defraud the United States. 689 F.2d at
242.
8. Cincotta, 689 F.2d at 242. The court noted, however, that the existence of the agent's
intent to benefit the corporation need not be specified in the indictment. Id.
9. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 2, at 53-56; Elkins, supra note 4, at 100-16. See also
Model Penal Code § 2.07 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) discussed in Developments in the Law,
supra note 4, at 1251-59.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Hangar One, Inc., 563 F.2d 1151, 1158 (5th Cir. 1977)
(liability of corporation "may arise from the conduct of employees other than those with 'sub-
stantial authority and broad responsibility' "); Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. United States, 307
F.2d 120, 127 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. George F. Fish, Inc., 154 F.2d 798, 801 (2d
Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 869 (1946). See also United States v. Koppers Co., 652 F.2d
290, 298 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981) (rejecting corporation's claim that
liability can be imputed only from acts of "high managerial agents." The court, however,
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subordinate, even menial, employees" as long as the employee acts
with the intention to benefit the corporation.11
II. COMPANY POLICIES, COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS AND A
"DUE DILIGENCE" DEFENSE
Several recent decisions consider whether the existence of corpo-
rate regulations and policies directly prohibiting the unlawful activ-
ity engaged in by a corporation's employee or agent should absolve
the corporation of criminal liability. Early cases indicated that a cor-
poration could defend a criminal charge by showing that the agent
contravened an established company policy." Good faith and due
diligence also were recognized as a basis to avoid the imposition of
criminal liability. 3
Although many commentators support such a due diligence de-
fense, 14 recent case authority generally rejects the concept. The pre-
vailing view is that a corporation will be held criminally liable for
the conduct of its agents and employees acting within the scope of
their employment and for the purpose of benefitting the company,
notwithstanding corporate policies or instructions expressly prohibit-
ing the criminal conduct.1 '
A leading case establishing this principle is United States v.
Hilton Hotels Corp.' In Hilton Hotels the corporation was held lia-
approved an instruction allowing the imposition of liability from acts of "managerial agents"
suggesting perhaps a willingness to limit the scope of liability).
11. Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 127 (5th Cir. 1962). See
also Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States, 330 F.2d 719, 722 (5th Cir. 1963).
12. Nobile v. United States, 284 F. 253 (3d Cir. 1922); John Gund Brewing Co. v.
United States, 204 F. 17 (8th Cir. 1913), modified, 206 F. 386 (1913).
13. Holland Furnace Co. v. United States, 158 F.2d 2, 3 (6th Cir. 1946). In this case
the court of appeals reversed a corporation's criminal conviction for knowingly violating a War
Board order by selling a new furnace on the misrepresentation that the customer's old furnace
was not repairable. The court held that the due diligence and care of the corporation to ensure
compliance with criminal statutes by their employees is a defense to a criminal prosecution
based on imputed liability. This defense was subsequently disapproved in Continental Baking
Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137, 149-51 (6th Cir. 1960).
14. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 2, at 68; Mueller, supra note 3, at 28; Developments,
supra note 4; Comment, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Really Necessary?, 29 Sw. L.J. 908,
927 (1975). But see Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Other Arguments Against a
Due Diligence Defense to Corporate Criminal Liability, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 447, 502 (1982).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 568 F.2d 1078, 1090 (5th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004. (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); United States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 205 (3rd Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971); Continental
Baking Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137, 150-51 (6th Cir. 1960); United States v. Armour
& Co., 168 F.2d 342, 343 (3d Cir. 1948).
16. 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
ble under the Sherman Act because an agent threatened a supplier
with a loss of the hotel's business unless the supplier paid a trade
association's assessment. The court found the imposition of liability
to be proper notwithstanding findings that the agent acted contrary
to clear company policy, that the agent was specifically told twice
never to engage in such conduct, and that the agent violated his in-
structions because of a personal hostility toward the supplier's repre-
sentative.17 Two recent cases, however, may mark a move away from
the prevailing rule. In United States v. Beusch,18 the defendant cor-
poration appealed its conviction of 377 misdemeanor violations of the
Bank Secrecy Act." The corporation contended on appeal, among
other things, that it lacked the requisite willfulness to violate the Act,
and that the jury instruction given was improper since it imposed
strict liability on the corporation based on actions of an employee
that were contrary to the express instructions and policies of the
corporation."
The court rejected the corporation's claim that there was no suf-
ficient basis to impute the willfulness of the acts of the agent,
Beusch, to the corporation. In so concluding, the court restated the
current law that the acts of an agent can be imputed to a corporation
when the agent's purpose is to benefit the corporation."
The court also rejected the corporation's claim that the jury in-
struction imposed strict liability on the corporate defendant without
proof of intent. The court noted that the challenged instruction was
followed by clarifying instructions under which the existence of a
corporate compliance program could be considered by the jury.2'
When viewed in context, the court found the challenged instruction
17. 467 F.2d at 1004.
18. 596 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1979).
19. 31 U.S.C. § 1058 et seq.
20. The jury instruction was as follows: "A corporation may be responsible for the acts
of its agents done or made within the scope of its authority, even though the agent's conduct
may be contrary to the corporation's actual instruction or contrary to the corporation's stated
policies." 596 F.2d at 877.
21. Id. Liability under the Bank Secrecy Act is imposed for a willful violation. 31
U.S.C. § 1058.
22. These instructions provided:
You may, however, consider the corporate policies and instructions as one of the
circumstances along with any other circumstances that you find to be significant
in determining what the authority of the agent actually was and whether the
agent was acting on behalf of the corporation.
In order to be acting within the scope of his authority, the employee must be
found to be acting on behalf of the corporation with the purpose of benefitting
the corporation or serving some corporate purpose.
596 F.2d at 878 n.7.
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to be adequate. The court explained:
[A] corporation may be liable for acts of its employees done con-
trary to express instructions and policies, but . . . the existence
of such instructions and policies may be considered in determin-
ing whether the employee in fact acted to benefit the corpora-
tion. Merely stating or publishing such instructions and policies
without diligently enforcing them is not enough to place the acts
of an employee who violates them outside the scope of his em-
ployment. [citation] It is a question of fact whether measures
taken to enforce corporate policy in this area will adequately
insulate the corporation against such acts . . ..
A similar result was reached recently by the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals in United States v. Basic Construction Co.2" In
Basic Construction the corporation was convicted of a criminal viola-
tion of the Sherman Act arising from bid-rigging activities of two
"relatively minor officials" of the corporation. The employees acted
without the knowledge of the corporate officers and in contravention
of the corporation's "longstanding, well known, and strictly enforced
policy against bid-rigging.""5 The defendant corporation contended
that the jury should have been instructed to consider the corpora-
tion's antitrust compliance policies for the purpose of determining
whether the corporation had the requisite intent, rather than for the
purpose of deciding whether the corporate agents were acting to ben-
efit the corporation.. 6 The court rejected this argument, citing the
general rule that a corporation may be held criminally responsible
for the violations of employees acting within the scope of their au-
thority and for the corporation's benefit. The court noted, however,
that "the district court properly allowed the jury to consider Basic's
[the corporate defendant's] alleged antitrust compliance policy in de-
termining whether the employees were acting for the benefit of the
corporation."2 7
23. Id. at 878 (emphasis in original).
24. 711 F.2d 570 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 371 (1983).
25. 711 F.2d at 572.
26. The court had stated in part:
A corporation may be responsible for the action of its agents done or made
within the scope of their authority, even though the conduct of the agents may
be contrary to the corporation's actual instructions, or contrary to the corpora-
tion's stated position.
However, the existence of such instructions and policies, if any be shown, may
be considered by you in determining whether the agents, in fact, were acting to
benefit the corporation.
27. Id. at 573.
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The recognition in Beusch and Basic Construction that the jury
should be permitted to consider the corporation's policies and in-
structions in its determination of whether an employee acted to bene-
fit the corporation is a departure from the prevailing view. As noted,
prior cases have deemed the existence of corporate policies, compli-
ance programs, and specific instructions irrelevant to the evaluation
of corporate criminal liability. Courts have found the corporation lia-
ble notwithstanding contrary policies because of a perceived non-del-
egable duty of a corporation to supervise its employees,28 or because
of the belief that conviction and punishment of the corporation are
appropriate and effective means to lessen the incidence of the unlaw-
ful activity. 2
The recent trend recognizes the relevance of compliance pro-
grams and intracorporate policies. Although such policies do not in-
sulate a corporation from the broad vicarious liability to which it
may be subject, the jury is permitted to consider the policies in eval-
uating whether the errant employee acted to benefit the corporation.
III. CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF DISSOLVED CORPORATIONS AND
THEIR SUCCESSORS
In this era when mergers and acquisitions are increasingly com-
mon, issues arise as to the criminal liability of successor corporations
and dissolved entities. At common law the dissolution of a corpora-
tion had the same effect as the death of a natural person, abating all
litigation in which the corporation was involved."0 Despite this rule,
it is now established that, if state statutes so provide, proceedings can
be instituted against a dissolved corporation."
Whether such a dissolved corporation could be liable in crimi-
nal proceedings was the source of significant judicial debate.82 The
United States Supreme Court ended any doubt about whether a dis-
28. See, e.g., Continental Baking Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137, 150 (6th Cir.
1960); United States v. Armour & Co., 168 F.2d 342, 343-44 (3d Cir. 1948).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004-06 (9th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
30. Chicago Title Co. v. Wilcox Bldg. Corp. 302 U.S. 120, 125 (1937); Oklahoma Nat-
ural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 273 U.S. 257, 259 (1927); Mumma v. Potomac Company, 33 U.S.
281, 286 (8 Pet.) (1834).
31. See Defense Supplies Corp. v. Lawrence Warehouse Co., 336 U.S. 631, 634-35
(1949).
32. Compare United States v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 140 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1974)
(criminal proceedings against dissolved corporation improper based on the language of state
corporation law) with United States v. P.F. Collier & Son Corp., 208 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1953)
(criminal proceedings against dissolved corporation proper in view of policy considerations).
[Vol. 24
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solved corporation could incur criminal liability in Melrose Distill-
ers, Inc. v. United States.38 In Melrose the petitioners were subsidi-
aries of another corporation that had been indicted for violating the
Sherman Act. Shortly after the indictment was returned, they were
dissolved and became separate divisions of a new corporation under
the same ultimate ownership. Noting that the petitioners continued
to operate after dissolution as new subsidiaries under the same ulti-
mate ownership, the Court found no basis to distinguish between the
civil and criminal liability of a dissolved corporation."M
A successor corporation, as well, may be liable for the criminal
acts of its predecessor.3 One court recently explained that "an ex-
isting corporation . . .[cannot escape] criminal liability for past acts
simply by discarding its offending element by a transfer of assets."'
It is debatable whether the same corporation could be liable both as
the surviving corporation and as the merged corporation.3
IV. PROBATION AND FINES
Much has been written about the rationale for punishing a cor-
poration for the crimes of its agents.3" A recent trend, however, to-
ward mandatory probation for a corporation convicted of criminal
conduct is noteworthy. Probation may lead to increased judicial in-
tervention into the corporate infrastructure, although the parameters
are still unclear.""
Two recent cases discuss whether a corporation convicted of
criminal violations of the antitrust laws can be required to pay part
of its fines to community groups without violating the Probation
Act.40 The cases reach opposite conclusions.
33. 359 U.S. 271 (1959).
34. Id. at 274.
35. Emprise Corp. v. United States, 419 U.S. 1120 (1975); United States v. Michigan
Carton Co., 552 F.2d 198, 201 (7th Cir. 1977) (dictum); United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d
856, 909 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. United States v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 537 F.
Supp. 427, 431-32 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
36. United States v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 427, 432 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
37. Id. at 431. Compare United States v. Stone, 452 F.2d 42, 47 (8th Cir. 1971) with
United States v. Michigan Carton Co., 552 F.2d 198, 201 (7th Cir. 1977).
38. See, e.g., Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution,
Fault and Sanctions, 56 S. CALIF. L. REv. 1141 (1983); Coffee, "No Soul to Damn: No Body
to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MicH. L.
REv. 386 (1981).
39. See Coffee, supra note 37, at 448-55; see also Recent Developments, The Applica-
tion ofthe Federal Probation Act to the Corporate Entity: United States v. Atlantic Richfield, 3
U. BALT. L. RFv. 294 (1974).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 3651.
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In United States v. Prescon Corp.,4' the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a judge may not permit a corporation, as an alter-
native to payment of a fine, to make a contribution to a community
group. The court reversed the district court which had suspended the
corporate defendant's fine on the condition that a lesser amount be
paid to community groups selected by the chief probation officer.
The court reasoned that the Probation Act limited courts to requir-
ing defendants to make payments, in lieu of a fine, only to "ag-
grieved parties for actual damages or loss caused by the offense for
which conviction was had.""" It is unclear who the court believed
were the parties aggrieved by the defendants' criminal conduct.4
The Eighth Circuit found to the contrary in United States v.
William Anderson Co."4 In William Anderson the district court im-
posed probation on the corporate defendant found guilty of price fix-
ing. In addition to imposing a fine, the trial court provided that the
defendant could elect to pay part of the fine to charitable organiza-
tions which would cause the amount of the fine to be reduced. The
government objected on several grounds, but primarily on the basis
that the Probation Act requires payment of the fine to the United
States Treasury."'
The Court of Appeals rebuked the government and lauded the
district court's "[creative], innovative, and imaginative sentence. ' '1"
Stating that the fine was imposed as a term of probation and not as a
sentence, the court noted that the Probation Act permits the imposi-
tion of "behavioral sanctions. '47
41. 695 F.2d 1236 (10th Cir. 1982).
42. Id. at 1243. The court based its decision on the language of the Probation Act which
provides: "While on probation and the conditions thereof, the defendant ...[mlay be re-
quired to make restitution or reparation to aggrieved parties for actual damages or loss caused
by the offense for which conviction was had. ... 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976).
43. Id. at 1243-44. Perhaps the court deemed the public at large to be the only accept-
able aggrieved party for the antitrust violation. See White Collar Crime: 1983 Update, 21 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 294, 294-95 (1983).
44. 698 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1982).
45. Id. at 914. This is the same argument with which the Government prevailed in
Prescon. See generally Note, United States v. William Anderson Co.: "Crime in the Suites"
Alternative Sentencing of Corporate Defendants, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1025 (1983).
46. 698 F.2d at 913. The court also rejected the argument that a corporation, as a legal
fiction, is incapable of rehabilitation and should be solely compelled to pay money. Id. at 914.
47. Id. at 913. See also United States v. Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. 1159
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (Probation Act allows requiring six bakeries convicted of Sherman Act viola-
tions to pay fine and to donate fresh baked goods to needy organizations).
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V. CONSPIRACY AND THE RICO ENTERPRISE
The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, concerning the capacity
of a corporation to conspire with its own officers and agents, has had
its most frequent application in the antitrust context.48 The issue,
however, has arisen in other areas."9
In United States v. Hartley,50 the court carefully described the
complicated system devised by defendants to defraud the government
into purchasing breaded shrimp below government standards. The
court gave thoughtful consideration to whether a corporation can
conspire with its own employees, agents, and officers.5" Stating that
an acceptance of the legal fiction that a corporation and its agents
are a single entity would permit "a corporation or its agents to hide
behind the identity of the other," ' the court held that it is possible
for a corporation to conspire with its own officers, agents, and em-
ployees where criminal liability is at issue.53
The Hartley court's acceptance of an intracorporate conspiracy
as a basis for corporate criminal liability is notable. Recent cases
adhere to the general rule that a corporation may not be subject to
civil liability when the actors involved are employees of a single cor-
poration.H The Hartley court and others, however, heeding the ad-
vice of Justice Harlan that "the fiction of corporate entity . . . had
never been applied as a shield against criminal prosecutions,"55 have
refused to follow the rule regarding civil liability and have held that
a corporation may be convicted of conspiracy with its officers, agents,
48. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube, Corp., 104 S. Ct. 60 (1984) (parent
corporation cannot conspire with wholly owned subsidiary under § 1 of Sherman Act); Brick-
ey, Conspiracy, Group Danger and the Corporate Defendant, 52 CIN. L. REV. 431 (1983).
Yet, most cases hold that a corporation may not form a conspiracy with its officers and agents
punishable under section I of the Sherman Act. Id. at 434. See also Handler and Smart, The
Present Status of the Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine, 3 CARDOZO L. REV. 23 (1981).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 347 (1982); United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 834 (1983). In both of these cases, the individual defendants, officers, and employees of
the corporation, as well as the defendant corporations, were convicted of conspiracy and the
intent to defraud the government.
50. 678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir. 1982). cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 834 (1983).
51. 678 F.2d at 970-72. This discussion is dictum since the court previously found a
conspiracy involving government inspectors as well.
52. Id. at 970. The court added that the greatest adherence to the single-entity fiction
was in the antitrust sphere because of factors unique to that area. Id. at 970-71.
53. Id. at 972.
54. Smith v. Northern Michigan Hospitals, Inc., 703 F.2d 942, 951 (6th Cir. 1983);
General Business Sys. v. North American Phillips Corp., 699 F.2d 965, 980 (9th Cir. 1983).
55. United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 417 (1962) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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and employees."
The conduct of the defendants in Hartley was also the basis for
a conviction under a subpart of the Racketeering Influenced and
Corrupt Practices Act (RICO).57 In Hartley the court considered
whether a corporation could simultaneously be the defendant and the
criminal "enterprise" under the RICO statute. The court rejected
the corporation's allegations that it could not associate with itself as
an enterprise under the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine and that
the corporation could not be the enterprise and a defendant simulta-
neously. This conclusion was based upon the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in United States v. Turkette," which the Hartley court inter-
preted as evidencing a "willingness to expand the scope of RICO's
application" as well as giving a "broad reading" to the term "enter-
prise," in addition to the absence of any prohibition against finding a
corporate defendant to have assumed a dual role."' More specifically,
the court reasoned that proof of the corporate existence was suffi-
cient proof of an enterprise-a concept distinct from those acts giving
rise to criminal liability. 0
The Fourth Circuit reached a seemingly contrary conclusion in
United States v. Computer Sciences Corp.61 In Computer Sciences the
court considered the propriety of the district court's dismissal of the
56. United States v. S & Vee Cartage Co., 704 F.2d 914, 920 (6th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 968-72 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Consolidated Coal
Co., 424 F. Supp. 577, 581 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
57. The elements of a RICO offense are: (1) acquisition of the enterprise affecting inter-
state commerce with inome received from a pattern of racketeering activity; (2) acquisition or
maintenance of an interest in an enterprise affecting interstate commerce through a pattern of
racketeering activity; (3) conducting the affairs of an enterprise affecting interstate commerce
through a pattern of racketeering; or (4) conspiracy to violate any of the above. 18 U.S.C. §
1962.
RICO has become a "formidable weapon in the government's arsenal to wage war against
crime." Hartley, 678 F.2d at 987. A discussion of RICO and its uses, however, is beyond the
scope of this article. See Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REV. 291 (1983); Blakey &
Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts, 53 T mp.
L.Q. 1009, 1014 (1980).
58. 452 U.S. 576 (1981) (the term "enterprise" as used in RICO encompasses both
legitimate and illegitimate enterprises).
59. 678 F.2d at 988. The court acknowledged that "(slince a corporation is liable for the
acts of its agents and employees, it [the corporate liability doctrine] permits an employee's
activities to serve as proof of the two predicate acts required by section 1962(c)." The court
noted, however, that "[tjhis is simply a reality faced by corporate entities," explaining that
"[w]ith the advantages of incorporation, must come the appendant responsibilities." Id. at 988-
89 n.43.
60. Id. at 988. The court found further support for its holding in the general corpora-
tions law providing for "piercing the corporate veil" and in "common sense." Id. at 989.
61. 689 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 729 (1983).
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57-count indictment charging defendants with, among other things,
RICO violations, conspiracy, and defrauding the United States by
overbilling the General Services Administration. Relevant here is the
court's RICO discussion in which the court concluded "that 'enter-
prise' was meant to refer to a being different from, not the same as
or part of, the person whose behavior the act was designed to pro-
hibit, and, failing that, to punish."" Although the court found that a
corporate division could be the "enterprise" under the RICO statute,
the court found an identity between the "person" and the "enter-
prise," thus preventing RICO liability."
VI. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of corporate criminal liability, thus, can be seen to
be a doctrine that is constantly evolving. Through the expansion of
the tort principle of respondeat superior, corporations became liable
for crimes committed by low level employees acting contrary to cor-
porate policy. Recently however, courts have expressed a degree of
sympathy for a "due diligence" defense by permitting evidence of
compliance programs and corporate policies to go to the jury. More-
over, there are indications that the traditional attitudes towards pun-
ishment for corporate crimes may be undergoing a change. And, in
the area of intracorporate conspiracy, the traditional rule that a cor-
poration may not be subject to civil liability when the actors involved
are employees of that corporation is being questioned in the context
of criminal prosecutions, particularly those under the Racketeering
Influenced and Corrupt Practices Act.
62. Id. at 1190.
63. The court added:
To be sure, the analogy between individuals and fictive persons such as corpora-
tions is not exact. Still, we would not take seriously, in the absence, at least, of
very explicit statutory language, an assertion that a defendant could conspire
with his right arm, which held, aimed and fired the fatal weapon. A corpora-
tion, in common parlance, is not regarded as distinct from its unincorporated
divisions either.
Id. For a further discussion of this issue, see Note, RICO: The Corporation As "Enterprise
and Defendant," 52 CIN. L. REv. 503 (1983).
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